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Legislation considers men [and women] as he [she] is, in order to turn 
him [her] to good uses in human society. Out of ferocity, avarice, and 
ambition, the three vices which run throughout the human race, it cre-
ates the military, merchant, and the governing classes, and thus the 
strength, riches, and wisdom of commonwealths. Out of these three 
great vices, which would certainly destroy all mankind on the face of 
the earth, it creates civil happiness.
Giambattista Vico, The New Science, 1968 (1744), p. 62.
In most of Africa, the state is a contested terrain where different nation-
alities, sub-nationalities, ‘ethnic groups’ and communities go to fight 
for the appropriation of resources including power. A state which is a 
contested terrain in this sense can only be an anarchy of self-seeking 
and a theatre of war.
Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, 2003, p. 167.
Dalkeennii la kala qaybiyee cadowga loo qayday
Qaadan waa awoogeen amxaar qurub la siiyaaye
Qarqarsiga ka dirir iyo anaa qaabbil kuu taline
Maantoo qudhiisii xabaal lagu qarqooreeyey
Weli qoonti way taagan tahay quudhsigii shalaye
Qaxar iyo dhib nagu soo kordhiyo qolada mooyaane
Weli qoodhi kama ay dhammaan qaranka soomaale
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Hal haddii qaddaru eebbahay kaare kala qaaro
In la qalo ninkii dhiqi jiraa aan ka qaanicine
Dabbaax baa mindida kula qadhqadha qaalinta irmaane
Qasdigoodu ba’anaa kuwaa qurus ka doonaaya
Qaabaanqabtiyo beelyadiyo haaddan qananaysa
EE waax qabiil lagu hantiyo garasho qoodaystay
Qorshohoodu socon maayo oo ways qatalayaane
EEbbow qarkay maanta taal qadanka soo meeri
Soomaalidaa kala qubane qoysba dhan u jeedo
Qaraabada isugu keen allow qaabad nabadaysa
Qarankeenni soo celi aallow qaaddirbaa tahaye!
Maxamuud A. Cabdalle (Shiine) 2006
I. Introduction
As of this writing, too far from “civil happiness,” Somalis continue 
sliding deeper into a fallen time—pitiful victims of their own follies 
and an ill-informed, if not manipulative, international and regional 
system. More precisely, the fight over the state in the past decade and 
a half has been at once violent and so disabling that, in the eyes of the 
rest of the world, Somalis have become the paradigmatic embodiment 
of self-inflicted politicide. Dismayingly, though the Somali state insti-
tutions are no more, the contestants wage their battles as if the prize 
is just waiting to be picked up. Oblivious, then, to the fact that the 
state and governance are more than the sum of capricious self-promo-
tion and claims of Potemkin political appellations and appointments, 
the aggressively ambitious bestow a vulgar concreteness to Jorge Luis 
Borges’ metaphor of the condition of “two bald men fighting over a 
comb.” The ultimate costs of the death of the state and subsequent 
communal strife are a withering of the national civic identity and 
spirit and, therefore, a descent into a form of moronic existence. Six 
instantiations of this condition are: (a) disunity exemplified by some 
in the northern Somali Republic (Somaliland) calling for a separate 
sovereignty in that region; (b) an essentialization of clanist maneuvers 
and mischief that have proven to be incapable of producing legitimate 
and competent leaders fit for the challenges of the epoch, let alone 
bring forth workable institutions for the immediate juncture; (c) the 
degeneration of Mogadishu from the once breezy, relatively cosmo-
politan nerve-center of the post-colonial order to a dilapidated hell’s 
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gate overwhelmed by new deadly conflagrations and mountains of ill-
disposed filth; (d) a deepening socioeconomic impoverishment, barely 
assuaged by remittances from relatives in the diaspora, decline in edu-
cational opportunities and standards, and deteriorating public health,1 
including the return of polio; (e) an acute national vulnerability to easy 
bamboozlement, and now direct military intervention or invasion by 
foreign actors, particularly neighboring Ethiopia; and (f) a mixture of 
incredulity and contempt on the part of the larger global community. 
To be sure, these negative attributes (and many more) make up the 
defining face of Somali reality. But it is also vital to note that, among 
the paradoxes of the current sharp cut in time (the meaning of civil 
war), numerous ordinary women and men, in every zone of the coun-
try, have taken it upon themselves to address the immediate concerns 
of their families and neighborhoods, the virus of sectarian cabals, and, 
commensurately, keep the candle of civic values flickering for a future 
undergirded by a peaceful and legitimate and competent governance.
If at the core of the Somali catastrophe, defined as a series of inter-
locked crises, is the bloody and unending tussle over political power 
and the direction of the society, last year’s tidings from Mogadishu 
conveyed the appearance of a new actor upon the stage: the Union of 
Islamic Courts. Claiming to be at once fed up with polluting warlord 
shenanigans and inspired and tightly held together by an Islamic zeit-
geist rather than kin loyalty or hunger for egotistical glory through 
personal rule, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) changed immediate 
history2: it defeated the warlords camped in Mogadishu; extended its 
influence into most of the deep south and the central regions; opened 
both Mogadishu airport and port facilities for general use; returned 
the streets of the capital to its denizens; challenged the legitimacy and 
leadership of what many Somalis had labeled a fadhiid-like (Somali 
for retarded) Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its regional 
patrons; and rattled the nerves of some of the foreign policy officials 
of the current U.S. Administration3 and strict secularists. Despite some 
lightning successes and raising the already high temperature of poli-
tics in Somalia, the victory of the UIC did not last long. A combination 
of sophomoric tactical mistakes (e.g., reactionary and foolish social 
policy declarations and acts, severe lack of administrative and worldly 
sophistication, and ill-prepared but loud nationalist bravado against 
an Ethiopian regime itching for an opportunity to set up its own cli-
ents to run Somalia) and a desperate pleading by the leadership of 
the TFG (President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Ali Geedi), 
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under an alarmist fabrication that “Islamic terrorists” aligned with 
Al-Qaida had infiltrated the UIC, convinced the U.S. to bless and aid 
Ethiopia’s invasion.4 The ultimate objectives included these three: to 
destroy the Union of Islamic Courts, their leadership and base of sup-
port; to capture Mogadishu; and to install Colonel Yusuf and his agree-
able regime.
At the moment of this writing, the Ethiopian invasion is five-months 
old and has had the following consequences: Mogadishu’s residents 
are thrown back into the violent and twilight zone where immediate 
deprivation and untimely death lurk; Ethiopian forces and their junior 
Somali satraps are pitted against an urban resistance that is not limited 
to the remnants of the armed wing of the UIC militia; over a thousand 
persons have been killed so far, and hundreds of thousands of civilians 
have fled, increasing pressure on already dismal conditions for refu-
gees in camps inside and outside the boundaries of the country; hatred 
for Ethiopia and sympathy for, if not solidarity with, the resistance has 
become more visible, particularly among the diaspora;5 and any pos-
sible redemption and effectiveness of the TFG has all but evaporated, 
except among those who either betray stigmata of clanist vice or are 
driven by sheer opportunistic motivations. Here is how one reporter 
relayed the crux of these developments:
There was a burst of optimism beginning Dec. 28, when government 
troops, with Ethiopian firepower behind them, marched into Mogadishu 
and planted the hope that the anarchy was ending. Cheering crowds 
poured into ruined streets. Aid experts in Nairobi circulated ambitious 
reconstruction plans. Ethiopian and American officials, who had worked 
together to overthrow the Islamists, breathed a mutual sigh of relief.
But what has happened in the past few weeks has killed (my emphasis) 
that mood. A deadly insurgency has started, beginning with a few clans 
connected to the Islamists and now expanding to several more… . All 
analysts agree that the violence will continue and probably intensify 
unless the government reconciles with clan elders, who control as much 
as anyone controls, what happens in Somalia.
…So far, there’s been very little of that. Instead of reaching out to truly 
influential figures, analysts say the government has picked ministers not 
because they have any substantial support among their clans but because 
they will do the government’s bidding. The result is an increasingly iso-
lated, authoritarian and unpopular government in which the transitional 
president, Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, is accused of behaving more like a 
clan warlord (my emphasis)—which he was—than a national leader.6
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Looking at these reports closely reminds one of Aristotle’s injunc-
tion in The Politics that two things are most corrosive of political leader-
ship and institutions: hatred and contempt. The first is the antithesis 
of good will, compassion, and fairness; the latter is the opposite of 
respect, integrity, and wise competence—the essential ingredients of 
authority. Given such dire circumstances, the Somali catastrophe has 
entered a new stage: direct foreign occupation and an ugly spectacle 
typified by bloodletting and civic dishonor. This assignment, more 
urgent than ever, is an exploration of the aporia of governance in the 
contemporary Somali milieu. Seeking theoretical and narrative accu-
mulation, it raises four pertinent and difficult questions:
•  What is the state?
•  Why do Somalis need a national state?
•  What kind of a state might that be?
•  How might that state come into being and maintain a viable exis-
tence?
While it is not possible to treat exhaustively these large questions, I 
will attempt to enter into each one of them, with a hope of advancing 
the practical reasoning so much needed among Somalis, particularly 
those who aspire to influence the fate of the country in a constructive 
way. This essay, partly drawing on and updating already published 
research, has four main components. First, I will address briefly the 
phenomena of the state and governance. Second, I will present a his-
torical sketch of the Somali context. Third, I will examine the current 
age of statelessness and some attempts to reconstruct the state. Fourth, 
I will reassert why the state is even more significant for the journey 
forward and will offer a quick look at some different arrangements of 
governance that a new state might take. I will conclude with a few civic 
meditations. Finally, there are two supreme convictions that inform this 
exercise. The first is that the state is not only, in the famous expression of 
Jacob Burckhardt, “a work of art,” it is equally a necessity for civilized living.7 
The second relates to the role of intellectuals in contexts similar to the 
Somali one. Since by themselves they can’t stop the politically egotisti-
cal and their armies, in the memorable words of Julian Benda, “from 
filling all history with the noise of their hatred and their slaughters,” 
intellectuals can deny them the opportunity of “thinking of themselves 
as great men [or women] as they carry out these activities.”8
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II. The State: What is it?
To talk about governance presupposes the existence of both political 
activity and a state. If governance is the concrete manner of conduct-
ing public power, politics is the sum of multifarious engagements that, 
first, establish contact and workable concordance among strangers 
and, second, accompany competition for influence and authority. The 
state is, essentially, the main institutional link between politics and 
governance. The interplay between the three is constant.
Basic political activities precede the appearance of the state and 
are not confined to its formal arena.9 Primordial groups, typified by 
small bands and intimacy or, more precisely, kin attachments, have 
existed and continue to survive, ever so precariously, without a for-
mal authority structure solely designed to perform political tasks. 
Such communities negotiate myriad individual and family interests 
and idiosyncrasies, in addition to the vagaries of the general material 
and cultural context, through custom and a set of reciprocal (talantaali 
or gemeinschaft) but not necessarily equal arrangements. The seeds of 
what we call the state are buried in those early human activities, but 
the appearance of the state as we have known it is a relatively mod-
ern design. One would trace the genetic base and evolution through 
a number of historical thresholds, which perhaps began with “city 
republican forms” best exemplified by the little known but pioneering 
Mesopotamian urban experiences and, later, the other more celebrated 
version in classical Greece. These early aggregations of large, but by 
no means universal, interests and networks, provision of public goods, 
and the subsequent investments of authority in persons embedded in 
such institutions give glimpses of some of the enduring characteristics 
of what we contemporaneously identify as the state.
The evolution of the idea and structuring of the state is long and 
complicated, and with numerous variations. That story is not told here. 
What is relevant to our purposes is to note its ancient pedigree, define 
its morphology, and point towards its key attributes. I define the state 
as a constellation of norms, and institutions and those who inhabit them, 
ostensibly to manage the collective political fate of a given society. Political 
destiny includes significant contradictions and concerns that add up to 
political identity and direction. Structurally, a state has the following 
features: monopoly on coercion, specific territorial boundaries, a rela-
tively fixed population, economic and cultural functions, sovereignty, 
and recognition by other states and their organizations. The supreme 
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public power, the state, in Stuart Hall’s phrase, is “a historical phenom-
enon;” that is, a creation of human beings in interaction which, in turn, 
also acts in profound ways upon individual and collective life.
A. Frames
The state is not some formless thing. Rather, its internal constitution 
can be anatomized. I suggest, heuristically, four main elements that 
make up the state: leader, regime, administration, and commonwealth. 
I touch upon each briefly.
The leader is the individual who immediately embodies the state in 
question. He/she can make a positive difference in his/her time, leav-
ing behind a legacy of competence, constitutionalism, and order. On 
the other hand, the leader can also preside over ineptness, corruption, 
and institutional disarray, whose consequences include an undermin-
ing of constructive efforts by others and the killing of civic spirit.
But leadership in not just “personal.” Usually appointed by the 
leader, a regime is a constellation of officials assigned to the highest 
portfolios of executive authority. To be sure, even under the most 
favorable circumstances, both a leader and her/his team have their 
own individual and clique interests that they represent. Nonetheless, if 
a regime is to attain any modicum of acceptance and legitimacy by the 
larger society, self or factional gain would have to be tamed by a com-
bination of inclusive aspiration, a consciousness of needs, ethical and 
legal conduct, and effective management. Thus, members of a success-
ful regime are, in Walter Lippman’s expression, “the custodians of a 
nation’s ideals, of the beliefs it cherishes, of its permanent hopes, of the 
faith which makes a nation out of a mere aggregation of individuals.” 
Moreover, leadership or regime cannot limit itself solely to the role of 
the keeper of tradition and noble ambition; rather, progress depends 
on the intellect to detect and the courage to articulate the hidden, and 
even the unutterable, elements of what is often called “vision.”
Figure 1.1
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The administrative frame underscores the infrastructure of the state. 
Here are located institutions (e.g., civil service, courts, law enforce-
ment, and educational policy, facilities, curricula and personnel) that 
carry out the day-to-day assignments and preserve procedures and 
documents of the operations of the state. This is important for the way 
a society governs itself—one which presents a test case for a regime to 
monitor itself, the relative autonomy of offices and institutions, and 
their competence. In other words, the greater the compliance with 
basic rules and the legitimacy of state apparatuses, the larger the divi-
dends for both a regime’s reputation and the viability of public life 
and order. In contrast, the more the operational organs are tied to the 
whims of regime interest, the greater the degree of evaporation of the 
rightfulness of all three frames. This is the ultimate cost of incompe-
tence and corruption.
The final element of the state is the most complex yet foundational: 
commonwealth. In its most inclusive sense, this entails the association 
and spirit of public belonging that is not easily derailed by narrow 
impulses. To create an identity large enough to accommodate kinship 
with the other beyond filial or other exclusive affiliations is to transmute 
the self into a citizen—the oldest of the challenges to the establishment 
of a political community. Here, then, particularity meets universal-
ity—that is, individual or group interest engages the imperative of a 
large social bond characterized by civic values and, in the felicitous 
expression of Edmund Burke, “common affections.” To be sure, leader-
ship and regime formation in one sense are testimony to a significant 
and inescapable alienation that comes with the momentary victory of 
one group. Commonwealth, by contrast, absorbs the divisive fallout 
from oppositional politics as it reinvigorates vivere civile. The result is 
the return of the state, through sound governance, to societal owner-
ship, a source of competence and an architect of common destiny. 
Without this grounding spirit of belonging, particularity becomes the 
norm—the antithesis of a national project. Politics, through the opera-
tions of the state, then is an unavoidable and contradictory activity 
that at once unveils centrifugal issues and facilitates centripetal ideas 
and action. In weighing the balance of the tension between difference 
and commonality, it is the latter that defines the health of political life 
in a given society. For, beyond the struggle for power, a rather narrow 
objective that could easily lead to a desolation of the spirit, a politics 
fit for “symbiotic creatures” is, in the lasting reflections of Johannes 
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Althusius, “the art of associating men [and women] for the purpose of 
establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them.”
Each of the four frames of the state, much like the parts of a body, 
performs at once its own local functions and works in concert with the 
rest to keep the whole purring along. Any damage to one means trou-
ble for the others; and when the accumulation of deficiencies becomes 
greater than the assets, the state and its society are confronted with 
major problems. Be that as it may, it will be a mistake to overlook the 
significance of both the larger society, that is, the matrix of private 
space and action, and the global environment. Put more precisely, in 
addition to the vitality of the frames, the degree of health or morbidity 
of the state is also conditioned by its history, endowments of its society, 
and the vagaries of regional and transnational circumstances. Such a 
configuration of frames and forces produces different state forms that, 
in turn, have consequences for the seminal project of development.
States come in many guises (see Figure 1.2). For the sake of parsi-
mony, however, one could offer a spectrum that registers five possible 
types that vary from, at one extreme, the highly effective, to its oppo-
site, the dead. The primary distinguishing factors include (a) the hale-
ness of each frame; (b) the degree of coordination; and (c) the depth of 
interior attachments to fellowship and collective realization.
Since no state is immune to the vicissitudes that result from the 
jostling among individuals as well as larger social forces, a quintes-
sential element of human historicity, an integral state is emblematic of 
a moment of delicate balance. That is, the cost of the quotidian grind 
and its intimidating ambiguities is compensated by efficacious state 
actions that replenish a mentality of collective stake-holding and exude 
hope. Antonio Gramsci, so existentially and theoretically aware of this 
supreme contradiction, reduces the challenge to its basics:
Figure 1.2: Forms of State
Adapted from Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., The African State: Recon-
siderations, p. 9.
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What is needed for [an integral state]…are men [and women] of sober 
mind…who don’t cause an absence of bread in the bakeries, who make 
trains run, and who provide the factories with new materials and know 
how to turn the produce of the country into industrial produce, who 
insure the safety and freedoms of the people…who enable the network 
of collective services to function and who do not reduce the people to a 
despair and to a horrible carnage.10
Gramsci’s effective state does not only succeed in delivering public 
goods but, particularly important, the leadership generates a degree of 
moral and intellectual bonding with the citizens. This “organic” affilia-
tion is central to what he calls “hegemony,” or the establishment of the 
“national-popular.” Africa has yet to produce an integral state.
If an integral state is the guardian of isonomic polity and general 
prosperity, a developmental state is the next best project. In this context, 
the state is conspicuously activist in both the improvement of human 
capital and the enhancement of the productive forces and national 
accumulation. But, as has often been the record, achievements in the 
economic and social realms may come at the cost of civic pluralism 
and basic liberties. Because the developmental state is primarily driven 
by ambition to quickly mollify external and domestic vulnerabilities of 
the society, such a singular attention leaves little room for open dissent 
and debate. In the end, a developmental state is visibly Janus-faced—
impressive in marshalling resources and building economic capacity, 
but relatively less attentive to the creation of an ambience conducive to 
republican individuation. Moreover, and in acute cases, heavy disin-
centives are presented to those who dare to disagree or insist on moral 
autonomy.
There are exceptions to the discrepancy between development and 
democracy, as the case of Botswana demonstrates. The Botswana state 
has been Africa’s premier developmental state. Despite the shackles 
inherited from British colonialism, the state qualitatively transformed 
its society from a South African labor reserve to one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world for the better part of the last 35 years. 
Botswana maintained genuine commitment to liberal democracy since 
independence. This blending of development and democracy makes 
Botswana unique among developmental states. Botswana has some of 
the ingredients necessary for establishing an integral state.
Post-apartheid South Africa is a state in transformation. The inde-
pendent state has strong democratic credentials. Leadership commit-
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ted to democracy is supported and monitored by vibrant civil society. 
South Africa is striving hard to undo white economic domination and 
to empower the majority in order to sustain its new democracy. This 
requires the broadening and deepening of the country’s physical and 
social infrastructure. The successful dual transformation of South 
Africa will depend on the quality of state management, and how sup-
portive the global economic climate is. The key question in the South 
African debate is whether the neo-liberal shift in development policy 
will broaden and deepen the market.
A prebendal type is typically preoccupied with the protection and 
reproduction of the immediate interests of a regime and its associ-
ates. At the same time, the economy becomes a source of personal and 
group enrichment, usually in the form of shady rent-seeking, and the 
political institutions amount to little more than a haven for personal 
privilege. A key feature of a prebendal state is high dependency—a 
combination of subservience to external powers, venality, and des-
potism at home. Unless turned around, and there is time and space 
for such action, these liabilities increasingly blunt any developmental 
propulsion, creating a general culture of disregard for the common 
good. Nigeria was the archetypical prebendal state. However, it degen-
erated into a predatory institution under successive civilian and mili-
tary regimes. The cost of predation became exceedingly onerous under 
General Abacha’s regime. Consequently, key organs of civil society 
struggled against the regime during much of the 1990s. At the end, the 
military retreated and a civilian government was elected. Retired Gen-
eral Obasanjo’s leadership of the past decade made some encouraging 
attempts in rebuilding public institutions so they may gain legitimacy 
and sufficient capacity to meet the development needs of the Nigerian 
society. Nonetheless, heavy reliance on rent from oil, ethnic and reli-
gious antagonism, and a misappropriation of national wealth continue 
to be part of political practice.
The predatory state is synonymous with diabolical politics. When the 
prebendal state loses what little functional capacity and stability it had, 
alienation mounts apace. No more even a symbol of disordered legiti-
macy, the last veils of collective belonging drop, and scavenging over 
dwindling public resources becomes openly vicious. For the regime, 
with an ever-narrowing grid, leadership turns into its antithesis—that 
is, cruel selfishness that slides into open criminality. In the meantime, 
as decay advances, a mixture of aghastness and hyperanxiety over per-
sonal and family survival becomes the paradigm of social and political 
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conduct. With the full atrophy of the vital functions of the state, the 
centaurs become one-dimensional beasts. Together, these factors dis-
sipate the stock of citizenship and mark the beginnings of the death of 
civic virtue. As Maurice Godelier asserts, “without development of the 
material and intellectual productive forces, any society risks becoming 
gradually and unwittingly stagnant and turning in on itself, becoming 
less able to cope with the effects of internal conflicts.” Mobutu’s Zaire, 
Taylor’s Liberia, and Mugabe’s current Zimbabwe come to mind as 
proximate examples.
Sadly, the predatory state may not be the last stop in the glide 
towards optimum degeneration; it can get worse. With heightened 
physical and economic insecurity, and the evaporation of public dis-
course and life, many take flight to anywhere before the final cur-
tain. Those who stay behind are enveloped by a new barbarism, one 
defined by a looting of what is left of the commons, further retailing 
of identities, and prodigality of terror. Thus spoke Wole Soyinka, as he 
reflected on such happenings in parts of the continent:
The land of Syle Cheney-Coker, poet, who declares himself content to be 
‘the breakfast of the peasants,’ ‘the hands that help the fishermen bring 
in their catch,’ ‘a hand on the plough that tills the fields,’ is silenced. This 
land also of the playwright Ulisu Amadu Maddy, of the urbane critic 
Eldred Jones, of skilled silver and goldsmiths, of the sublime sculptures 
of the Nimba peoples and the timeless lyrics of their griots (a traditional 
musician/poet or minstrel), has been turned into a featureless landscape 
of rubble, of a traumatized populace and roaming canines among unbur-
ied cadavers. How does a sculptor begin to carve with only stumps for 
arms? How does a village griot ply his trade with only the root of the 
tongue still lodged at the gateway of memory? The rest has been cut 
out—often the hand that wields the knife is the hand of the future, the 
ubiquitous child-soldier—and the air is bereft even of the solace of its 
lament.
A lament can be purifying, consoling, for a lament still affirms the reten-
tion of soul, even of faith, yes, it is a cry of loss, of bereavement, an echo 
of pain but is, therefore, an affirmation of humanity, a reaching out to 
the world that is still human or to forces that shape humanity. A lament 
does not emerge from atrocities, for an atrocity is the very silencing 
of the human voice. It deadens the soul and clogs up the passages of 
hope, opening up in their place only sterile accusations, the resolve of 
vengeance, or else a total surrender to the triumph of banality. We can 
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no longer speak of wars on the continent, only arenas of competitive 
atrocities.11
The end point of such an experience is the cadaverous state. Every 
frame is damaged to such an extreme extent that civic life is, simply 
put, no more. An immediate lesson is how easy it is to demolish in 
quick time what has taken years to build. The Somali case is an instan-
tiation of this type.
III. History: A Backward Glance12
A review of the evolution of political order and authority in the Somali 
context could be periodized into the following: pre-colonial, colonial, 
and post-colonial. This section of the essay attempts to offer a highly 
compressed account of each, before I move on to the current conjunc-
ture of collective moral and institutional failures.
A. Pre-Colonial Order
The descent of Somali society into mutual hatred and full disintegra-
tion, best exemplified by the demise of the state, cannot be understood 
solely within the orbit of one isolated factor or another. Rather, the con-
dition is better understood by seeing it as the total shattering of a mode 
of being in the world and a companion failure to invent a new one. This 
now defunct mode of existence included a lean but sustainable mate-
rial production and reproduction; a cultural pattern, informed by a 
sense of the divine, which portrayed a moral code and common sense; 
and a loose political practice marked by local legitimacy and account-
ability. Buffeted by a compounded mixture of its own shortcomings 
and a series of powerful external intrusions, however, the old “form of 
life” gradually lost its delicate calibration and grace. No other moment 
in contemporary Somali history so somberly reflects such a loss of way 
than the killing of civic politics. Here, then, I attempt to: (1) recapture 
the substructure and nature of the old order; and (2) identify some of 
the major transformations (mostly focused on the state) that could be 
associated with the prevailing madness and destruction of virtue.
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1. The Constitution of Umma
Somalis of traditional times were not feral creatures, bereft of phronesis, 
who roamed lawlessly the range land of the Horn of Africa; on the 
contrary, they did create a long time ago a pastoral, and later some 
agro-pastoral, political economy based on a thorough awareness of the 
vagaries of a very exacting ecosystem. This mode of livelihood, based 
on the household and largely self-sufficient, had an intricate division 
of labor. For example, womenfolk were primarily responsible for the 
management of domestic concerns, including the condition of the por-
table home or Agal; men dealt most with issues of security, knowledge 
about the weather and the range, general welfare of the herd, and 
formal relations with the world outside, including relatives. Finally, 
young boys and girls were assigned to look after small ruminants graz-
ing around the homestead. Such material existence had some notable 
communitarian characteristics that included Miilo (a precise and trans-
parent procedure for fair distribution of water, the most precious of 
all resources on the range), agreements on access to pasture, and an 
informal but reciprocal claim on each other’s labors. But there was a 
downside to these arrangements. For instance, even in a good season, 
when the rains and pasture were plentiful, surplus was, at best, mea-
ger—turning economic activities into a perpetual effort of living on 
the edge. In other words, shortages and hunger were familiar shadows 
that haunted the Somali landscape. In the modern era of the late twen-
tieth century—an age of expanding human and livestock populations, 
declining ecosystems, and changing appetites and habits of consump-
tion—the old and precarious, if somewhat balanced, material life was 
bound to come under great stress.
The economic basis of early Somali society had correlate political 
institutions and practices: kinship—a combination of blood-ties and 
customary law. Each household, Reer, was led by the oldest male, usu-
ally the father or grandfather, who was expected, particularly at a 
certain age, to have acquired a degree of competence in local history, 
culture, and values. Further, this person was connected to two kinds of 
immediate social networks. The first and most primary was the Tol, a 
solidarity with male-kin based on a belief in a common male lineage; 
the second, though more shallow and of less weight, was based on 
marriage ties, or Xidid.
Male-lineage identities performed many positive functions of which 
security and the payment of blood-money, Mug, or restitution to an 
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injured party, and mutual assistance in hard times like droughts were 
paramount. On the other hand, Tol identity was totally exclusive, liable 
to group privilege and, in times of high stakes, susceptible to chauvin-
istic demonization of the “Other.” Xidid, bonding through marriage, 
was the first counterweight to the narrowness of Tol in that it expanded 
a man’s self-definition by obligating him to his in-laws and the people 
of his mother. A second element of kinship was Xeer, an unwritten 
code of conduct that set specific guidelines for intra- and inter-kin 
transactions. Within the compass of Xeer were the following: preserva-
tion of the wisdom of the ages and habits of community, delineation of 
obligations and entitlements, and supervision of criminal justice. The 
combination of Xidid and Xeer further offset the parochialism of Tol by 
enlarging the range of affiliations. The incarnation of the confluence of 
those pieces of kinship culture was the elder, one of two foundations of 
traditional leadership. In a few larger and somewhat more structured 
kin communities, august appellations like Sultan or Ugaas were used.
The other part of the old moral order was Islam. Arriving on the 
Somali shores around the tenth century, Islam, through Al-Quran, Al-
Hadith, and Al-Sunnah, infused new and powerful values into the exist-
ing Somali cosmology. Among these were a deeper spirituality and a 
greater sense of piety. At the worldly level, Islam also brought Qanoon, 
a set of laws to guide the behavior of the believers. Much more than 
Xeer, Islam extended the margins of the relevant universe by linking 
Somalis to a world of co-religionists. The bearer of this new knowledge 
and, as a result, the leader in this realm was the Sheikh, the learned 
and reverent. Under the aegis of such leaders, the crucial affairs of the 
community were discussed in open meetings, Shir. Finally, from the 
perspective of the modern world, it is worth registering that the old 
Somali order carried the seeds of two essential ingredients of demo-
cratic practice: separation of powers and open, participatory delibera-
tions, albeit male-centered. The calibration of the above elements set 
the basis of Somali society for a large stretch of its existence. Despite 
a rigorous environment with a very modest economic base that fre-
quently created tensions among various kin groups and clashes with 
the neighbors (particularly Abyssinians), the Somali people of the Horn 
of Africa moved through history with a sense of independence and 
confidence. But that situation did not last forever, for new and momen-
tous transformations that will dramatically alter the nature of political 
authority and culture were in the offing. I will present a thumbnail 
sketch of critical watersheds.
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B. Conquest: The Colonial Order
Somali contact with the outside world did not start with the onset of 
colonialism. Earlier, as mercantile trade spread into the Indian Ocean 
littoral, coastal towns like Mogadishu, Merca, and Zeila appeared. The 
main purveyors of these activities were Middle Eastern and Islamic 
merchants. Although the center of gravity of Somali society contin-
ued to be located in the interior, or Miyii, the establishment of urban 
centers underlined a growing economic and cultural interaction with 
other and distant worlds. In short, Muslim traders became the first 
bridgeheads in the gradual “incorporation” of Somali society into the 
expanding “modern world-system.” New commodities began to find 
their way into the hinterland, slowly impacting social relations and 
habits. With their new wares and culture of literacy, Middle Eastern 
arrivals to the coast began to attract a few Somalis with their induce-
ments. Here was the genesis of the family “middleman” who will 
divide his loyalties between the merchants from other lands and kin 
group in the countryside.
Whatever was the balance of forces between the urban/coastal towns 
and the hinterland, by the closing stages of the nineteenth century, a 
new and revolutionary force arrived: multiple colonizers. First there 
were the British and the French, and later the Italians, to be joined 
at the table for the scramble for Somali territories by the Emperor of 
Ethiopia, Menelik. By 1920, despite a fierce resistance on the part of 
Somalis led by the legendary Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, colo-
nial order in five guises was in place. For our purposes, some of the 
most visible consequences of the conquest were the following:
•  Persuasion of some Somali elders to become clients of the new colo-
nial schemes represented by a governor or district commissioner.
•  Intimidation and humiliation, or ultimately dismissal, of those who 
failed to comply.
•  Appointment of collaborators who were, in large measure, account-
able only to the colonial authorities.
•  Emerging class differentiation based on lowly bureaucratic appoint-
ments, participation in the colonial economy—particularly the 
export of livestock from the North—and land expropriation by the 
fascists in the riverine areas of the South.
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•  Calculated manipulation of differences and disputes among kin 
groups, which frequently pitted one group against another and gave 
old communal antipathies new combustion.
•  Conscious and frequent use of state violence to bring populations to 
heel.
•  Relegation of Islam to a private affair with little relevance to the 
political order.
•  Decoupling of the operational side of the state from a sense of righ-
teousness and inclusive community.
•  Total defeat of Somalis by turning them into subjects of five differ-
ent colonial administrations.
Nearly half a century after the consolidation of colonialism, nation-
alist forces taking the inspiration from the heroism of the Dervish 
movement of Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, a general awakening 
of other subjugated societies, and emboldened by a moral as well as 
material weakening of the colonial metropole due to the circumstances 
surrounding the Second World War, won their campaign for indepen-
dence. Precisely, on July 1, 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia 
joined together to become the new Somali Republic, leaving the other 
three (Djibouti, the Ogaden, and the NFD) under foreign rule.
C. The Post-Colonial State
Typical of African decolonization, the Somali post-colonial state came 
into the world draped in sharp contradictions. On the one hand, it 
effused a populist temper that promised both a retrieval of collective 
honor and peoplehood, and a quick march towards socio-economic 
development. On the other hand, there was very little understanding, 
particularly on the part of most of the new leadership and regimes, of 
the complexities of domestic reconstitution, let alone the difficulties 
inherent in profitably engaging a bi-polar international system.
Within a few years, the glow of independence began to dim. In fact, 
as early as 1961, signs of regional discontent appeared when a group of 
mutinous junior military officers from the North took over Hargeisa. 
In that same year, in a referendum, a very thin majority of the North-
erners voted against the constitution, which was designed to become 
the basis of the new polity. On both occasions, a component of the 
Northern elite saw the new dispensation as biased towards the South. 
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Looking at the distribution of the senior political leadership, regime 
portfolios, high echelons of the new bureaucracy, and other state appa-
ratuses, as well as the concentration of most significant decision-mak-
ing in Mogadishu, the seeds of regional jealousy and suspicion were 
planted—to be a lasting source of exploitation by a few ambitious 
individuals. Furthermore, while investments were made in a few agri-
cultural and educational projects, serious socio-economic development 
was left on the back burner. Those early years, then, set the basis for 
three characteristics that will define a considerable part of the civilian 
tenure of the post-colonial state: relentless competition among a nar-
row elite over the spoils of the state through reckless looting of a very 
precarious economy; fixation on liberating the other three Somali terri-
tories; and a desperate search for international patrons that will supply 
both economic and military aid.
The one exceptional but brief moment was between 1964 and 1967. 
Those four years are now overwhelmingly regarded by both Somalis 
and others informed about the country’s political history as an inter-
lude of extraordinary leadership as a result of the combined ethical 
resoluteness and diligent demeanor of President Aden A. Osman and 
Premier Abdirazak H. Hussein. Between them, they set competence 
and probity as the signature tune in the conduct of the state. Meditat-
ing on the disheartening history of governance in Somalia over the past 
three-and-a-half decades, one of the country’s most respected senior 
civil servants, Ali Said Araleh, testified thus:
Aden was so strict with the taxpayers’ money that he saved enough from 
the presidency annual budget to build a presidential retreat in Afgoi, 
while others were pocketing public money. For instance, Prime Minister 
Egal used public revenue to build his private villa (Villa Baidoa) on the 
road to Afgoi. Prime Minister Abidirazak’s respect for the law and his 
anti-corruption effort has no parallel in our history. His hands are abso-
lutely untainted and the two are peerless as Somali leaders.13
In those yesteryears of civilian order, obsession with winning a 
seat in parliament turned electoral politics into a fractious business in 
which over sixty parties were registered for 123 seats in 1969. Further, 
office-holding became a license for indulgence in Musuq Maasaq, that 
is, corruption and unethical behavior. The second item made the popu-
lation somewhat schizophrenic in that the very regimes that were so 
offensive to them were, in the same breath, asking of them to mobilize 
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selflessly for a continuation of the nationalist struggle. The third issue 
set Somalia on its reputation as a beggar nation, heavily reliant on 
external contributions to both the annual budget and the financing of 
development expenditures. It also drove the whole region into the vor-
tex of Superpower competition. By 1969, nine years of civilian incom-
petence and malfeasance culminated in the assassination of President 
Sharmarkee, testimony to the widening gulf between the state and 
society. A few days later, the military stepped in.
General Siyaad Barre’s regime’s tenure (1969–1990) can be divided 
into two broad periods: 1969–1979 and 1980–1990. Siyaad Barre and 
his cohorts (the Somali Revolutionary Council or SRC) came to power 
with the promise of eliminating corruption, rebuilding the economy 
and social institutions, returning to a genuine democratic governance, 
and a re-enchantment of the sense of national purpose. The first few 
years were notable for a number of bold initiatives. For instance, an 
official orthography was set for the Somali language, accompanied 
by a successful literacy campaign. New schools and roads were built, 
cooperative farms were established, and laws affirming the equality 
of women were introduced. All in all, despite an expansive nation-
alization of economic activity and the public shooting of two very 
senior SRC colleagues of Siyaad Barre and ten theologians, the regime 
enjoyed a modicum of popularity up to the middle of the decade.
The years from 1975 to 1978 were determinative. Nationalization 
bred new forms of cronyism and inefficiencies that began to enervate 
productivity and transactions, compelling many to withdraw from the 
official economy. Relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies had 
developed into a tighter embrace, with more military equipment pour-
ing into Somalia and, in the process, creating one of the largest armed 
forces in Black Africa. Further, the rhetoric about socialist democracy 
began to wear thin and voices of dissent started to speak about what 
they saw as the emergence of a harsh state and sycophantic politics. By 
mid-1977, with the Ethiopian regime of Col. Mengistu still reeling from 
gruesome internal power struggles, Somali forces in combination with 
guerillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) mounted a 
surprise and initially successful attack on the Somali-inhabited region 
of Ethiopia. They captured almost all of the Ogaden, except the three 
large cities of Jigjiga, Harar, and Dire Dawa. By early 1978, the Sovi-
ets had shifted their allegiance to Ethiopia. Together with Cuban and 
South Yemeni troops and new Soviet weapons, the Ethiopians coun-
terattacked. Within a short time, the Somalis were decimated and then 
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compelled to withdraw. By all accounts, the cost was enormous. In 
addition to the loss of thousands of lives, the war generated high infla-
tion, as well as made the face of state power more militaristic. In the 
wake of intense recriminations that followed, a group of military offi-
cers staged a bloody but unsuccessful coup. The year 1979 closed with 
no external patron, deteriorating economic conditions, large refugee 
populations, serious damage to regime credibility, and the appearance 
of organized dissidence claiming the loyalties of their respective kin 
groups. Siyaad Barre and the regime responded by manipulating kin-
based identities and, worse than the colonial administrations, pitted 
one segment of society against another, while the state was turned into 
a fortress. At this juncture, the Somali state clearly showed the same 
maladies that Clapham identified in many countries on the continent:
The rapid increase in the militarization of Sub-Saharan Africa from 
the mid-1970s onwards was a response, not simply to external devel-
opments, but to the desperate attempts of autocratic states to impose 
themselves on increasingly rebellious populations. The result, gener-
ally speaking, was to accelerate the process of state decay, while vastly 
increasing the cost in human suffering.14
The period from 1980 to 1990 was the decade of real decay, unprece-
dented repression, civil war, and final dissolution. Despite aid from the 
new Reagan Administration, including military training and supplies, 
the economy got worse. Here, the most onerous of the burdens fell on 
the farming communities of the lands in between and adjacent to the 
Shabelle and Juba rivers. For instance, tensions between customary 
land tenure and post-colonial state interventions in the form of lease-
holding became acute. In addition, as the urban economy—including 
salaries and other amenities of state offices—declined precipitously, 
political power was deployed to arbitrarily grab pieces of land in these 
riverine zones. In many situations, this was tantamount to a full dispos-
session of the tillers of the land whose generations of intensive labor 
made these regions into the most productive parts of Somalia. But 
economic suffering was not limited to the southern regions. In many 
parts of the North, a growing privatization of the common range, more 
permanent settlements, and supervision of communal practices of land 
use had pressed hard on the environment. In addition, by the end of 
the 1980s a combination of highly top-heavy state decisions, mounting 
and commodified economic activities, and changing habits of everyday 
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life had created new and dramatic circumstances. An extensive study 
in even remote Erigavo District underscores these transformations. It is 
worthy of extensive quotation.
The development of a cash economy, coupled with the remittances from 
the Gulf in terms of goods-in-kind for animals sold there, has meant that 
the average pastoralist now has greater access to consumer items such 
as mass-produced cooking utensils and clothing. Also now more readily 
available are substitute foods, in particular white flour and white rice. 
The pastoral women claimed that to a large extent these new foods were 
substituted for their traditional diet, based on meat and sorghum. This 
change in customary diet, while convenient for pastoralists as the new 
foods can be easily stored and transported, had a negative nutritional 
impact. The new foods are significantly lower in iron and the B vitamins 
than the traditional meat and sorghum diet… . The Erigavo District has 
the dubious distinction of recording one of the highest maternal mortal-
ity rates in the world, a trend which could be markedly reversed if a 
return to the traditional diet could be achieved.15
New IMF structural adjustment policies triggered the devaluation of 
the shilling by more than 90 percent, further cutbacks in state employ-
ment and social spending, and a worsening trade balance. In 1985, the 
national debt climbed to the tune of US $1 billion. Further, armed dis-
sidents started to mount guerrilla-style challenges, crippling the reach 
of the authority of the state. The momentous year was 1988 when the 
forces of the Somali National Movement (SNM) crossed from their 
bases in Ethiopia and fought their way into some of the major cen-
ters in northwestern Somalia, including Hargeisa. A fierce engagement 
ensued in which the full military weight of the state was unleashed on 
mostly Isaaq-inhabited zones of the region. Thousands were killed, 
two of the towns heavily damaged—Hargeisa with the help of aerial 
bombardment—and tens of thousands hurried across the border in 
search of refuge in Ethiopia.
These events awakened the world to what was happening in Soma-
lia. Consequently, international aid, including nearly $680 million from 
the United States, began to dry up, further isolating the regime. In 
1989, rebellion spread to many areas of the South. Siyaad Barre, in a 
last-ditch effort to salvage his authority, sent more weapons to his kin 
and cronies while at the same time doubling his efforts to weaken the 
opposition through greater exploitation of lineage differences. By the 
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end of the year, the capital and a few other urban centers were under 
the effective rule of the regime.
In January 1991, Mogadishu itself exploded. After a month of hand-
to-hand combat between the last remnants of the fully clanized Somali 
army and the forces of the United Somali Congress (USC), who had 
a large following in the capital, the regime expired. Thousands died, 
and Siyaad Barre escaped to the territory of his kin, leaving behind a 
ruined country and people.
IV. Dissolution and Political Squalor
From 1991 to the present could be best characterized as years of mis-
anthropy, blood-letting, greater destruction of whatever was left of the 
elements of the national state, massive and concentrated starvation, 
the break-up of the North and South, failed international interven-
tion, continuing exodus from the country, and a generalized existential 
bleakness, especially for the majority inside the country.
As soon as Siyaad Barre fled, the leader of the civilian wing of the 
USC, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, was declared the interim president. Two 
immediate consequences followed: (1) General Aideed, the chairman 
of the USC and commander of their fighting forces, was quick to anath-
ematize the act as an unwarranted and unilateral power grab; and (2) 
he threw a gauntlet by announcing himself to be the rightful person to 
assume the office. These developments destabilized the already fragile 
alliance within the Hawiye lineage group, which was predominant 
around the environs of the capital. In the meantime, other armed orga-
nizations, or Jabhad, around the country, of which there were no less 
than a dozen, made their own counterclaims. Personal ambition com-
bined with assumed representation of local interests, and the disap-
pearance of central authority, gave aspiring individuals confidence to 
press for any advantage.
To compress, in quick time other developments transpired. First, 
some of the better organized and armed kin groups declared war 
on the USC and, subsequently, helped spread the post-Siyaad Barre 
atrocities to many areas of the South. Second, the SNM proclaimed 
the northern region a new sovereign state—the Republic of Somali-
land. Third, Mogadishu entered its second and longest phase of may-
hem and savagery. Since the capital was the premium, the Mahdi and 
Aideed forces went at each other with unrestrained ferocity. Simulta-
neously, thousands of armed hungry men and derelict youth gangs 
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roamed the streets and neighborhoods, pillaging with great abandon. 
Fourth, hundreds of thousands were made destitute and displaced, 
causing greater movements of people inside the country and across 
the borders to the neighboring countries and beyond. Fifth, with a total 
lack of security and disruption of economic activities, particularly in 
the agricultural zones of the South, widespread hunger turned into a 
carnival of starvation.
Offended and alarmed by vivid pictures of suffering and grim news 
from Somalia, in early December 1992, a multinational force of over 
34,000 troops (of which 24,000 were Americans) landed on the beaches 
of Mogadishu. By mid-1993, the immediate goal of delivering food to 
the starving was accomplished. However, other objectives like disar-
mament of clan militias, inception of a national dialogue, and rebuild-
ing of basic public institutions proved very difficult.
The United Nations, which took over command of the multinational 
forces as well as the political mission, convened a number of high-pro-
file conferences among the more than one dozen factions and a few 
representatives from other segments of the society. While these meet-
ings came to be generally known for bizarre disagreements and petty 
jealousies among the participants, General Aideed became the most 
obdurate of them all. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 
1993, two ugly and jarring events took place. First, on June 5, twenty-
two U.S. troops were killed and more wounded, while dozens of Soma-
lis lost their lives. The day after, the body of one of the dead Americans 
was dragged through the streets. In the wake of all this, a general con-
sensus was reached that Somalis had had their chance and, therefore, 
they should be left to their own devices. President Clinton set March 
31, 1994, for complete American withdrawal, with the U.N. mandate to 
end soon after.
A. Regional Particularities
If the last sixteen years were, quintessentially, a time of further descent 
into internecine warfare, destructive claims and counterclaims by 
somewhat known as well as obscure clanists, and international bewil-
derment, it has also been a time of some dramatic changes. Among the 
latter was the appearance of regionalist identities, partly as a logical 
extension of the confluence of the death of the national state, the rising 
prominence of genealogical affinities, and even narrower individualist 
subtexts that always hid in the inner folds of identity politics. The two 
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most pronounced examples of arguments for regional distinctiveness 
were: North (Somaliland) and Northeast (Puntland).
1. North (Somaliland)
This was, and still is, the most extreme of any advocacy for regional 
particularity. Founded on the assumption that the post-colonial Somali 
Republic was no more, proponents of this new entity (primarily incited 
by an agitated and armed wing of the SNM) declared the secession of 
the region from the rest of the country in Burao in May 1991. A care-
ful inquiry into the atmosphere surrounding the event shows that, 
in addition to the horrible developments taking place in Mogadishu, 
the Burao declaration was endorsed by those present (non-SNM) not 
because they were sold on the value of the idea but as a temporary 
acquiescence to prevent immediate bloodshed and to buy time for a 
return to noncoercive and democratic deliberations over the direc-
tion of the politics of the region. To date, that communal-wide and 
free conversation among the people of the area has not taken place. 
The only relevant act worth mentioning, in this context, is the conduct 
of an abruptly arranged constitutional referendum on May 31, 2001. 
Though it was reported that 97 percent of the votes cast endorsed 
the constitutional basis for an “independent Somaliland,” it became 
quickly evident that: (a) active encouragement and menacing discour-
agement dominated the atmosphere—that is, on the eve of the voting, 
enthusiastic mobilization was accorded those in favor of secession in 
contradistinction to intimidating pressures on dissenters, and (b) a 
boycotting by the communities of the eastern zone of the region was 
staged, a disaffection that has turned into defiant and bloody resis-
tance in this portion of the territory.
Despite the above, this region has produced significant accomplish-
ments, superior to any other initiatives in other parts of Somalia.16 First, 
and most noteworthy, is the creation of an indigenously constructed 
modus operandi among the various communities, which has resulted in 
a modicum of order. Second, rudimentary political structures of gover-
nance are in place. Here, the main units are: executive, legislature, and 
judiciary. The executive comprises a President and Vice President (and 
their appointed cabinet) directly elected through a general election 
for a five-year term. The legislature is made up of a Council of Repre-
sentatives and a small Council of Elders (the former is elected every 
five years; the latter every six years). Third, competition for electoral 
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office is channeled through competitive party politics. Fourth, a small 
but still growing proportion of children is attending school. Fifth, the 
rhythm of daily material existence and minimum economic transac-
tions, particularly in urban areas (albeit overwhelmingly buoyed by 
overseas remittances), are visible.
Notwithstanding these commendable accomplishments, there are 
worrisome issues. First, there are still many small arms in the hands 
of individuals or households. Second, on balance, the exodus of talent 
continues, as there are no major sources of employment. Third, with 
a puny (less than $30 million) annual budget and an absence of any 
external productive investment, severe impoverishment is common 
among the vast majority. Fourth, there is a visible return to the corrupt 
habits of the old and dead order—witnesses to such a reversion are the 
total dominance of the capital, Hargeisa, over the rest and the appear-
ance of a commensurate sociopolitical class that monopolizes major 
decisions and privileges. Fifth, apostasy with regard to the sanctity of 
national unity is promoted while any advocacy for the preservation of 
the national union is criminalized. Here, there is a calculated “other-
ing” of Somalis from outside of the region in order to deepen suspicion 
and, thus, create a new identity. Sixth, thus far political appointments 
have been profligate (e.g., a 40-member cabinet), ignoring the yawning 
discrepancy between, on one side, the necessity of parsimony and effec-
tiveness and, on the other, an irresponsible use of very meager public 
resources. Seventh, despite nearly a decade and a half of campaigning 
for international acceptance, no state has yet extended recognition to a 
new sovereignty called Somaliland. Eighth, the elite in Hargeisa have 
tied their own interests to the strategic designs of Ethiopia to such an 
extent that, as I write, there are no reports of any public outcry over the 
invasion of Ethiopian troops deep into the central regions of the South 
and the capital. Perhaps this is a measure of how deeply beholden to 
Ethiopian suzerainty are the region’s political class and their cause.
To recapitulate, the people of Northern Somalia (Somaliland) have 
made achievements worthy of note and deserving of further enthusias-
tic support. This is a source of victory and pride that I have called guul. 
However, the damages done are also substantial. Among the latter 
stands out the sectarian and instrumentalist ambition to secede that, in 
the act, degrades and then tears up national belonging, a phenomenon 
I have designated as godob. If used wisely, the transitional period ought 
to be an opportunity for the people within the region, as well as the 
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rest, to explore the possibilities for a new and workable political dis-
pensation and governance.
2. Northeast (Puntland)
Like the rest of the country, the people of the Northeastern region found 
themselves caught in the aftermath of the implosion of the Siyaad 
Barre government and the demise of the national state. Subsequently, a 
dual yet connected struggle ensued: on one side was the release of per-
sonal and political venom as well as ambition to grab local power; on 
the other was the collective urge to pick up the responsibilities for the 
general well-being of the region. Compounded by the arrival of large 
numbers of people fleeing from Mogadishu or getting out of refugee 
camps in other zones, the challenge of balancing narrow political inter-
ests, new religious militancy, and broad civic imperatives ended in 
violent encounters and instability, particularly between 1991 and 1998 
(five administrations in seven years!). The primary responsibility for 
this failure was attributed to the then dominant political organization, 
the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and its leadership. In 
addition, the United Somali Congress made its own forceful sectarian 
claims to the southern part of the region.
On July 23, 1998, in the wake of many months of multiple com-
munal discussions and infighting, the region was given a new name, 
“Puntland State,” with its charter to consecrate the decision. In August 
of 1998, a regional executive committee of nine ministers was named, 
to be followed by a regional assembly of sixty-nine members.
The Northeast’s new government is different from that of the North 
in one crucial point: the former declared itself to be no more than an 
autonomous part of a united Somalia; the latter is still categorical in 
the intention to secede. As for deficiencies, there are many. First, the 
Northeast’s material resource base is even more limited. With very low 
annual rainfall, for instance, there are no known areas suitable for any 
type of farming. Outside of the main city of Bosaaso, where the port is 
the focal point of some import/export transactions, and a few smaller 
urban enclaves, there are hardly any other significant sources of local 
employment. Like the North, what there is of investment comes pri-
marily from remittances from the people of the region who have sought 
and continue to look for refuge in other parts of Africa and beyond. 
Second, until a few years ago, the politics of the region was bedeviled 
by elements of the old leadership of the SSDF (particularly in the form 
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of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf), who insisted through violent acts on 
keeping political power to themselves. With Yusuf’s attention focused 
in the last few years on how to salvage his Siyaad Barre-like obsession 
with personal rule in the hapless Transitional Federal Government, 
the Northeast is relatively more stable. Given the feeble nature of the 
power and reach of the regional institutions, however, the coast of 
“Puntland” has become a haven for local pirates. Such criminal activi-
ties are known to be disruptions to maritime law and freedom of the 
seas. Therefore, international counteraction (particularly in the form 
of the presence of the United States Navy) is part of the oceanscape. 
Third, “Puntland” is embroiled in a simmering contest with “Somalil-
and” over the boundaries of the eastern zones of the latter. Propelled 
by both a clanist ideology that sees the kin groups of Sool and Sanaaq 
as belonging to an identity called Harti and with the active encourage-
ment of some of the denizens of the two local communities, politi-
cal leadership in “Puntland” has militarily clashed with the authority 
of the North, poisoning in the process the relationship between the 
two regions. Fourth, the southern settlements (e.g., Galkayo) of the 
Northeast are peopled by diverse kin communities, which, in times of 
incompetent and sectarian leadership, easily divide themselves into 
highly belligerent camps. Here, both the fissiparous reputation of the 
leadership and an absence of significant representation from the kin 
communities of the southern border areas diminish legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The new military collaboration between Ethiopian forces 
and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf’s militia, which had culminated in the 
invasion of the southern parts of the country and the bloody engage-
ments in Mogadishu, could only wreck any modicum of good will 
existing between communities sharing settlements or borders, espe-
cially in the North and the central areas.
If the North and the Northeast have been, relatively, zones of a 
return of some order, with the adoption of some constitutional pro-
cedures and attempts at building public institutions, then the rest of 
Somalia, until the now temporary rise of the UIC, has been mired in 
bloody underdevelopment. Unable to see through the trap of “other-
ing” and compounded by the diversity of communities (an asset in 
times of peace and the construction of a cosmopolitan culture) and the 
allure of capturing the capital and urban centers as well as laying claim 
to the rich farmland between rivers, these regions have been theaters 
for vicious “warlord” appetites. For many keen observers, it is in these 
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parts of the country (primarily from Mogadishu to Kismayo) where 
the cost of dissolution to the Somali people has been the greatest.
B. Attempts at Reconciliation and the Revival of the State}17
Since 1991, over a dozen gatherings, sponsored by different elements 
of the international society, were convened to bring representation 
from various groups. The declared purpose of all of these conferences 
was to restore peace and national authority. Two of them stand out 
among the rest for being at once promising and utterly disappointing.
1. Arta: A Betrayal of a Gift
Warlords and factional leaders dominated each of the eleven con-
ferences before Arta. All failed to produce consensus, as each self-
appointed warlord was adamant on insisting to be the rightful 
candidate for the presidency of the country. As a result, most Somalis 
submitted to the prospect of not seeing a national state in their lifetime. 
The bleakness of the predicament proved so paralyzing that it would 
fall to the partially Somali-populated small Republic of Djibouti and 
its leader to recharge hopes of saving Somalia from itself. Ismail Omar 
Gaileh, with the zest that accompanies a new presidency, coupled with 
his own primordial affinity with the Somali people, made a personal 
assignment of the pressing necessities of reducing regional instability 
and Djibouti’s immediate vulnerabilities.
With his surprise announcement at the U.N. General Assembly in 
1999 to convene a different gathering to rebuild Somalia, President 
Gaileh put the full energy of his administration behind the endeavor. 
So it was that this meeting of Somalis took place in Djibouti in March 
2000. A series of workshops were conducted for a month. Traditional 
leaders, businessmen, women, intellectuals, and others were invited. 
Most significantly, warlords were also extended a welcome, but not 
as veto holders. All in all, nearly 5,000 delegates came from every 
region to deliberate the future of their country. Predictably, most of 
the more self-important warlords stayed away; they complained that 
they were devalued by not being treated as the preeminent leaders 
of their respective communities. In response, the Djibouti hosts rein-
stated their welcome as individual participants, equal to the rest and, 
therefore, with no a priori privileged role. While the Government of 
Djibouti provided modest facilities and acted as a fair broker, the key 
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actors were Somali “traditional” leaders and former politicians. One 
moment in the proceedings is etched in the memory of those who were 
present: negotiations came to a halt when sharp conflicting interests 
clashed. Fearful that the whole conference was in danger of collapse, 
Gaileh intervened by appealing to the delegates to consider their col-
lective interest. In an emotionally charged tone, he pleaded, “Somaliyee 
ii hiiliya aan idiin hiiliye” (O Somalis, help me so that I can help you). 
The appeal moved the delegates and broke the logjam. Afterwards, 
the key obstacle proved to be the selection of the official delegates to 
the conference who, ultimately, were to choose a new parliament of 
245 deputies. The formula for working out the distribution of the seats 
was set at dividing the nation into 4.5 communities. In the meantime, a 
national transitional charter was drafted which the delegates approved 
and the provisional parliament later adopted. Perhaps the most daunt-
ing task was how to equitably parcel out the parliamentary seats within 
each community. This milestone was reached after some acute wran-
gling and, subsequently, Somalia’s first “democratically” selected cham-
ber of deputies was put into place. Moreover, the chamber proceeded 
to elect an interim president from several competing candidates. These 
developments took place without notable interference from the Dji-
bouti Government; and, critical to note, none of the defeated candi-
dates expressed any doubt that the host government was anything but 
impartial. In short, the Arta reconciliation conference brought achieve-
ments that seemed farfetched only a few months earlier. The Somali 
public, on the whole, responded with a conspicuous sense of relief, 
elation, and anticipation. In short, though not immune to intrigues 
among the delegates and their hangers-on, Arta seemed, in the words 
of the ancient poet Horace, “not to draw smoke from the brightness of 
light,” as others before it had done, “but to bring out light from smoky 
murk.” What would result from this initial success depended on the 
caliber of the new leadership, its reception in Mogadishu and the rest 
of the country, and the attitude of the neighboring countries, particu-
larly Ethiopia.
Interim President Abdiqasim Salad and his entourage made an 
unplanned visit to the ruined capital. Despite the chaos, hundreds of 
thousands came out to celebrate what they hoped to be the beginning 
of a peaceful era. But the promise soon tumbled as the Transitional 
National Government (TNG) was hobbled by a combination of Ethio-
pian-cum-warlord subversion, the clanistic formula (4.5) used to set 
representation, and the inherent defects of the new team.
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The first signal of trouble was the transparently unhappy presence 
of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, among the dignitar-
ies during the inaugural ceremony to congratulate Abdiqasim Salad. 
In retrospect, Zenawi’s attendance belied his hidden agenda of what 
he desired to become of Somalia. Salad immediately dispatched an 
envoy to visit Addis Ababa to relay that the new Somali Government 
was intent on collaborating closely with its neighbors and strengthen-
ing positive relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Later, several 
other expeditions were sent to emphasize Somali perspectives, but 
every delegation met with Ethiopian skepticism. Within six months, 
the Ethiopian strategy became clear. It at once started to stress the 
incompleteness of the peace process since the warlords were absent, 
and also declared that Islamists of the Al-Itihaad orientation dominated 
the interim government. In response, Salad and his cohorts made sev-
eral attempts to demonstrate otherwise and to reassure the Ethiopian 
leadership. However, the situation deteriorated to a point of no return 
when Ethiopia accused Salad himself of being a member of Al-Itihaad. 
From then on, Addis Ababa adopted a four-pronged strategy to desta-
bilize and delegitimate the TNG. First, Ethiopia convened a meeting 
for the warlords and, in the process, helped establish an umbrella 
structure for them, to be named the Somali Reconciliation and Recon-
struction Council (SRRC). Second, Ethiopia increased military supplies 
for members of the group. Third, Ethiopia actively lobbied at the OAU 
(now AU) and other international organizations to unseat the TNG. In 
this context, Ethiopia gave more encouragement to the self-proclaimed 
“Somaliland Republic” to enhance the latter’s search for recognition 
as an independent country while simultaneously repeating platitudes 
about the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic at pub-
lic forums, such as the assembly of the Heads of State and Govern-
ments of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 
in Eldoret and, more recently, at the AU meeting in Maputo. Finally, 
Ethiopia intensified its campaign at the IGAD forum to convene an 
IGAD-sponsored conference to “complete” the Arta process.
In the eyes of some, perhaps the conference’s greatest weakness 
was the working assumption that both clan identity and its associ-
ated numerical weight were to be the mechanism for representation. 
Many communities were alienated by the use of what they saw as an 
ill-founded and atavistic formula. In the meantime, the weaknesses of 
the TNG leadership were exposed. First to come to the fore was the 
fact that both the interim President (Mr. Abdiqasim Salad), and the 
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Prime Minister (Dr. Ali Kalif Galyedh), as well as many of the cabinet 
appointees, were remnants of the Siyaad era. Having failed to pub-
licly atone for that association undermined any popular hope for the 
beginning of a new political history. Second, no broad vision, let alone 
a specific one, was articulated for a national mobilization fit for the 
difficulties of the interregnum. Third, hardly any attention was paid 
to competence or integrity in the appointment of a new team, reviv-
ing memories of the vulgar and cheap horse-trading that crippled the 
old Somali national state. Fourth, no immediate tactics, never mind 
a strategy, were conceived to reach and win over the large and rela-
tively talented diaspora communities. Fifth, no quick advantage was 
taken of the international community, which was admittedly tired of 
Somali insouciance toward their national well-being but which may 
have become genuinely responsive to a mature, collective, and intel-
ligent plea from a new and legitimate Somali leadership. Sixth, Salad 
and Galyedh clashed and then turned on each other. Salad accused 
Galyedh of arrogance, a deficit of dexterity, and, most damaging, mal-
feasance, while the latter labeled the former as power-hungry and dic-
tatorial. With barely half of the three-year term of TNG gone, and after 
a parliamentary vote of no confidence, Galyedh was dismissed while 
abroad. The TNG’s tenure of three years ended without a single lasting 
achievement. Meditating on the utter disappointment in the autumn of 
2005, and with an eye on the current developments, President Gaileh 
attributed the main and constant cause of the failure of leadership to 
a “preoccupation with grabbing as much money as possible and as 
quickly, even before any new governance is fully installed.”18
2. Eldoret and Mbagathi: Corruption and Ethiopian-Warlord Axis
Ethiopia’s lobby at the OAU/AU failed, but its efforts at IGAD paid 
off. Members of the organization agreed to launch a Somali conference 
managed by what came to be dubbed “frontline states,” comprised of 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya (the last country acting as Chair). Under 
enormous international pressure, the TNG and the Djibouti Govern-
ment agreed to this proposal. Moreover, the TNG assumed the neu-
trality of Kenya. Sadly, this naïve presumption enabled Ethiopia and 
representatives of the international community to change the nature 
of the conference from one of reconciling the TNG and the warlords 
to a completely new one. The generation of lists representing three 
groups—the TNG, the warlords, and civil society—and the appoint-
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ment of a Kenyan, E. Mwangle, well known for his proclivities toward 
venality, set the stage for a disheveled and Ethiopian-dominated pro-
cess. The earliest alert that this was not a neutral approach transpired 
when the names of individuals in the civil society group whom Ethio-
pia deemed unfriendly were expunged from the list of participants. 
Furthermore, when members of the international community sug-
gested that the conference needed Somali resource persons, Chairman 
Mwangle (Kenya’s special envoy) submitted the list to warlords for 
their approval. They rejected it, and, consequently, this act gave them 
the confidence to thwart further conference deliberations that were not 
to their liking. The international representatives reintroduced the list 
to the IGAD Technical Committee. Once the Ethiopian delegation real-
ized that the list could not be vetoed, they argued for an expansion by 
adding five names they felt were amenable to their agenda. As a result, 
the list of resource persons grew to nearly twenty. This proved to 
be quantitatively too cumbersome. Therefore, it was agreed that both 
Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s additions would be put aside. In spite of this 
consensus, however, Chairman Mwangle made no attempt to call in 
the resource persons to the conference. Moreover, he never convened a 
meeting for those among the group who were already in Eldoret.
When the conference commenced, non-Somalis started to make the 
agenda. In one instance, an American doctoral student presented the 
points, which comprised the key items in the rules of procedure and 
the declaration of the cessation of hostilities. Among them was the 
establishment of a federal system of governance, a crucial issue in which 
Somalis did not have any say. In addition, the “mediators,” including 
the graduate student who held the title of “advisor” to the Chair, cre-
ated warlord-dominated “leaders’ committees” as the paramount deci-
sion-making organs of the conference. Again, there was no input from 
either the Somalis (outside of the warlords) or those who study Somali 
society. The upshot of all these compounded occurrences was that 
Ethiopia and its allies continued to try to gerrymander both the com-
position and quantity of the delegates. The final list of the participants 
in the plenary sessions was finalized as a newly elected government 
of Kenya appointed a new envoy (and Chair) to the conference. Fur-
thermore, in January, the site was moved to Mbagathi, on the outskirts 
of Nairobi. At that stage, representatives of the international commu-
nity and other observers confirmed that Ethiopia single-handedly con-
trolled two-thirds of the list of conference participants.
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Previously serving in senior diplomatic posts as well as top civil ser-
vant positions in Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador B. 
Kiplagat came with a clean reputation; that is, a degree of professional-
ism in a postcolonial Kenya known for the opposite. This appointment 
injected a sense of hope into the proceedings and Somalis expected 
him to behave as an honest mediator, one who would correct past mis-
deeds. Ambassador Kiplagat moved quickly to restore propriety to the 
process by relocating the conference to a cheaper location housed in a 
college rather than in an expensive hotel in Eldoret.
The first real test came with a contest over the nature of the list 
of participants, and the differentiation between the pirates and the 
legitimate individuals who represented civic communities. Unfortu-
nately, Ambassador Kiplagat failed to take action, for he seemed barely 
knowledgeable of the Somali problem, his superb diplomatic skills 
notwithstanding. Such a shortcoming emboldened those whose proj-
ect was to have their own instrumentally advantageous way. Most 
significantly, the warlords and their Ethiopian backers felt ensconced 
in their dominant role. But the issue of legitimacy could not be easily 
avoided, and Ambassador Kiplagat had to find a way to come to terms 
with it. Subsequently, he took the initiative of bringing forth a list of 
“traditional leaders” whom he intended to invite to the conference. 
This the warlords rejected, demonstrating three pivotal factors: (1) the 
Ambassador’s lack of knowledge about Somali culture and his unwill-
ingness to seek counsel from informed Somalis (traditional leaders are 
not subjects of anyone in communal affairs, let alone warlords); (2) the 
degree of power ceded to the warlords since the inception of the con-
ference; and (3) the significance of Ethiopian partisanship in distorting 
the negotiations. The puzzling question, then, was this: Why would a 
civic-minded and religious man acquiesce to the chicanery of people 
loyal only to their caprices (with criminal records to boot) and their 
patrons, allowing them to gain so much potency under his gaze? A 
plausible explanation was revealed when, on one occasion, the Ambas-
sador confided in another diplomat that he “did not want to fight Ethi-
opia.” This sentiment was reinforced by another statement he shared 
with a keen observer of the conference to the effect that the interests of 
Ethiopia and Kenya should be looked after during the conference.
Ethiopia and warlord dominance took a slight dip when Ambas-
sador Kiplagat appointed an independent Somali group to harmonize 
the documents produced by the conference’s six functional commit-
tees. The Ethiopian envoy and his deputy were alarmed when the 
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Chairperson of the Harmonization Committee, Professor Abdi Ismail 
Samatar, was introduced. The Ambassador claimed that Samatar was 
“partisan,” and therefore ought to be excluded. This line of argument 
did not convince the rest of IGAD’s Technical Committee, which com-
pelled Ethiopia to change its tactics. Ethiopia proposed that if Samatar 
was approved as Chair, Ethiopia should be given the opportunity to 
name Samatar’s deputy. This demand was turned down. It is impor-
tant to note here that neither Kenya nor Djibouti demanded the same 
privilege. From there on, Ethiopia and its clients focused their energy 
on how to derail the Harmonization Committee’s work, and warned 
that they would not accept the Committee’s report. Ambassador Kipla-
gat found himself in a tight spot. He tried to mend fences with Ethiopia 
and the warlords by suggesting that the Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the 
six committees join the Harmonization team. But soon the Ambassador 
realized that the quality of the work would suffer, as these additions 
were bound to bring their disagreements into the task of harmonizing 
the documents.
The Harmonization Committee handed its report to the chairman 
of the IGAD Technical Committee, and, after two minor changes, he 
requested that the document be presented to a full gathering of the 
entire Technical Committee and official representatives from the inter-
national community. Immediately, the Ethiopian emissaries walked 
out of the meeting, before reading the report or hearing its verbal 
presentation. Nonetheless, the discussion proceeded and the remain-
ing members of the Technical Committee and international partners 
commended the overall professional quality of the Harmonization 
Report and, more particularly, the draft charter that could cater to the 
common interest of the Somali people. Despite the news that, when it 
became public, Somalis inside and outside the country were enthusias-
tically receptive to the Harmonization Committee’s document, Ethio-
pian representatives began to discredit the draft charter and egged on 
their clients to resist it. The Ethiopian ambassador accused Professor 
Abdi Samatar of being a “traitor” and anti-Ethiopian. But he failed 
to articulate both the reasons behind the charges and the connection 
between the Harmonization Report and Ethiopia. After all, the peace 
process was for Somalia and not concerned, at least at this stage, with 
Somali-Ethiopian relations!
Later, the warlords attempted to produce their own version of the 
charter, but brought out a one-page document that addressed only 
three articles (the Harmonization Committee’s draft charter had 120 
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articles). When this proposal did not convince anyone, they put for-
ward a version of the draft charter favorable to their interests. Eighteen 
warlords signed a cover letter to Ambassador Kiplagat in which they 
openly stated that their version alone should be presented to the ple-
nary of the conference. If not, they threatened, they would walk out of 
the peace process altogether. There were six issues that distinguished 
the perspective of the warlords and the draft charter forwarded by the 
Harmonization Committee. First, the harmonization document had 
120 articles while the warlords’ contained 60 articles. Second, the war-
lords stipulated that the proposed interim parliament should have a 
total of 450 members; the Harmonization Committee suggested 171. 
Third, the warlords asked for an open-ended size of the executive port-
folios of the new government; the other specified that cabinet appoint-
ments should not exceed thirteen. Fourth, the warlords demanded that 
a federal form of governance be adopted immediately; the other pre-
ferred that a national constitutional commission be given the respon-
sibility of developing a federal constitution and determining what the 
constituent units should be. Fifth, and most critically, the warlords 
proposed that they themselves select members of the new parliament. 
The implications of such an idea meant that unelected delegates in 
the conference’s plenary would automatically become deputies and, 
moreover, the warlords would nominate the remaining fifty-nine MPs. 
In contrast, the harmonized charter suggested that communities ought 
to select their representatives in the interim parliament. Sixth, the war-
lords asserted that the tenure of an interim government be a period of 
five years; the harmonized document designated three years. The two 
documents were electronically posted (Hirraan.com) for three weeks, 
and readers were able to vote online to register their preference. Eighty 
percent of the respondents favored the harmonization charter.
Whatever the relative merits of the two documents, it was flabber-
gasting to witness the audacity of Ethiopia and its clients to demand 
that their self-serving draft charter alone should be debated in the 
plenary session. Also enigmatic was the fact that Ambassador Kipla-
gat, as Chairman of IGAD’s Technical Committee, succumbed to their 
demands despite the fact that a significant number of the civil society 
group and the official delegation of the TNG did not share the war-
lords’ demands. Soon thereafter, the Chairman’s task was made easier 
by a growing split within the ranks of the TNG. The Prime Minis-
ter (Mr. Hassan Abshir) and the Speaker of the TNG Parliament (Mr. 
Abdulla Deroow) decided, without prior consultation with the TNG’s 
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decision-making committee, to vote in favor of a warlord’s proposal for 
a compromise on major issues. With full realization that this change 
of mind contradicted the TNG’s official (written and on file) posi-
tion, the Chairman took advantage of the split by rushing the “signed 
compromise” to the plenary. Even more bewildering, the plenary’s 
function as the supreme locus of final debate and decisions (through 
consensus), duly stipulated by the conference’s rules of procedure, 
was premeditatedly preempted. Ambassador Kiplagat side-stepped 
this protocol and relayed to the plenary that the “leaders” had agreed 
on four key issues: the size of the assembly at 351 members; immediate 
adoption of federalism; an interim period of four years; and warlords 
and faction leaders, in consultation with traditional leaders, selecting 
members of parliament. Many of the delegates supporting the war-
lord and Ethiopian agenda, having received early notification of what 
was to come, cheered as Ambassador Kiplagat made the announce-
ment. Others who were not forewarned objected to what they saw as 
a deceitful stampede. Subsequently, they requested that the issues be 
discussed. Ambassador Kiplagat responded that the decision was final 
and immediately adjourned the meeting. The Ambassador’s behavior 
contravened the letter and spirit of reconciliation, and fueled a grow-
ing suspicion that he was predisposed from the outset toward a war-
lord-Ethiopian pact. At such a late hour, unless he regained his role as 
an impartial mediator, the entire process was likely to become illegiti-
mate, with Kenya’s accepted role as a neutral Somali neighbor fatally 
damaged and the peace conference doomed to the same fate as the 
many others that preceded it. For Ethiopia and its client warlords, their 
long-term project was clear: the warlords desired to either take total 
control of the country without concern for the niceties of representa-
tion and democratic legitimacy or to remain in command of separate 
fiefdoms. For its part, Ethiopia seemed bent on helping establish either 
a weak client state in Somalia led by a favorite warlord or, perhaps bet-
ter, fragmented and Bantustan-like territories in which Addis Ababa 
would call the shots more directly. In brief, the last scenario Ethiopia 
would welcome was a united and reinvigorated country, led by inde-
pendent-minded and able Somali leaders.
The conclusion of the Mbagathi conference produced the following: 
(a) a transitional Charter shaped by the political interests of the victori-
ous warlords, through eighteen members of the Leaders Committee; 
(b) a new name for the country, Somali Federal Transitional Republic; 
(c) a national legislature consisting of two chambers; (d) supremacy of 
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law; (e) freedom of the media; (f) the right to establish and organize 
political parties; and (g) a tenure of five years for the Transitional Fed-
eral institutions.
A careful examination of the Transitional Charter conveys some 
familiar but still laudable guarantees that were key ingredients in the 
Constitution of the old Somali Republic. These include equality of 
citizens in front of the law, freedom of expression and association, and 
the right to education and property. But there are major deficiencies. 
These could be divided into two: Charter-specific liabilities and TFG 
shortcomings. Among the first are the endorsement of the change from 
a unitary state to federalism without any nationwide discussion or 
referendum, an open invitation for endless clanist intrigue for regional 
status, the affirmation of an exaggerated number of seats in the new 
Parliament (initially 337, later reduced to 275 for the lower house and 
113 for an upper house yet to be set up), and an assumption that the 
extremely feeble economy of the Somali Republic would be able to 
support such an elaborate structure of governance. After nearly three 
years of existence, the main weaknesses of the TFG have become even 
more public. First, President Abdullahi Yusuf has proven to be short on 
leadership capabilities fit for making the transition into a time for rec-
onciliation, peace-making, and visionary competence. On the contrary, 
he has undermined the promise by, among others: acting unilaterally 
(a reminder of Siyaad Barre’s style); violating the division of power as 
set by the Charter; threatening any opposition with violence; selecting 
a prime minister with no leadership experience or qualifications suit-
able for such a complex task; acquiescing in the creation of 102 Cabi-
net positions whose appointees were mostly unqualified warlords or 
their recommended kin; continuing the use of the idiom and logic of 
clanism in his public and private utterances/calculations, all the way to 
the composition of his intimate advisors and adjuncts; and, most dis-
tressingly, inviting Ethiopia as a patron for the physical survival of his 
presidency and that of his regime.
The combined consequences of these structural and leadership 
deformities have been grave and numerous. Perhaps most telling were 
these facts: First, the TFG, in addition to serious internal and combus-
tible divisions (typified by last year’s resignation of eighteen key min-
isters), has yet to find a permanent physical location inside the country 
from which to govern, notwithstanding the highly temporary sites 
in confined Jowhar earlier, latter insecure Baidoa, and now furiously 
fought over Mogadishu. Compare this reality to President Abdullahi 
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Yusuf’s overconfident address to the Summit of the Islamic Conference 
in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on December 8, 2005:
The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is now fully functional 
inside Somalia trying to reclaim the country from its lawlessness. We 
are basically starting from scratch and despite our meager resources we 
are steadily achieving a tangible progress on the ground. The consolida-
tion of the New Government inside Somalia, together with improving 
stability, create a real opportunity to achieve peace and security, promote 
governance and the rule of law and begin recovery, reconstruction and 
development throughout Somalia.19
Second, the division within the TFG continues to be deep and 
wide:20 29 members of the cabinet resigned last August; the Prime Min-
ister was confronted with a vote of no confidence by a large majority 
of 200 parliamentary deputies who gathered to debate the efficacy of 
the regime; and a senior minister was assassinated, while another was 
injured. Third, and above all, there was the appearance and fast victo-
ries of the Union of Islamic Courts, who were defeated only with the 
large Ethiopian invasion and brutal occupation—evidence for a thick 
and broad alienation on the part of the larger public from the TFG.
C. The Union of Islamic Courts: An Alternative?
At the root of an awakened Islamic consciousness are at least eight 
factors: globalization and its nefarious economic and social effects on 
Islamic communities around the world; the total crash of the national 
state attributed to the destructive policies and corrosive personal lead-
ership and regime of Siyaad Barre; the subsequent descent into unprec-
edented internecine wars; the spread of clanist warlordism in pursuit 
of individual and sectarian interests; an evaporation of ethical values 
in public affairs; a paucity of a unifying civic action to successfully 
respond to the prevailing conditions (particularly safety, order, and 
economic well-being); an absence of an attractive vision expressive of 
collective redemption and a regenerative future; and a glaring loss of 
national pride that ushered in new levels of dependence and submis-
siveness to external machinations.
Notwithstanding a simplistic and quick typecasting by some observ-
ers, the composition of UIC was complex. Consequently, at this stage, 
let alone during its brief triumph, it is still difficult to discern fully the 
make up of the organization, its philosophical outlook, the sources 
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of its funding, its conception of the transitional period, its style of 
leadership and preferred form of state and governance, its long-term 
aspirations for the country, and its complete strategy to interact with 
the rest of the world. I will keep an engagement with these “on hold” 
for another time. A point to note here is that, despite the demise of 
the structure of the UIC, there is little doubt that its broad national 
sentiments are held by a significant portion of the Somali people. This 
implies that the sharpening contest over the long-term future of Soma-
lia by its people will be shaped by, among others, the presence of social 
and political Islamism. Such a development, in its generic necessity, 
seems unavoidable. Both historical identity and the pestilential nature 
of the present political climate press forth the relevance of a collec-
tive salvation informed by Islamic thought. If this is accurate, then, it 
seems appropriate and timely to start sorting out different orientations 
that might claim Islam as a source of inspiration. I proffer three broad 
scenarios. The defunct UIC was not an exception. In fact, its members 
might have conveyed all three perspectives. More importantly, both 
the current resistance to Ethiopian invasion and its ally the TFG, and 
debates over the future, are couched in Islamist terms that are simi-
lar to these orientations. Only the last option, in my opinion, has the 
potential to fully capacitate the faithful to deal with an entropic Somali 
Republic and an impatient hypermodern world.
1. Reactionary
In light of contemporary global affairs and the preoccupation with 
“terrorism,” this is the most common scenario that jumps immediately 
into the minds of the ill informed, especially non-Muslims. Beyond 
such a stereotypical reflex, however, there are occasions when the label 
fits. An inventory of features associated with a reactionary Islamic per-
spective includes: (a) a counterfeit innocence and zeal, (b) backward-
looking, literal, and completely dogmatic interpretations of the great 
texts of the Quran and the Hadith, (c) brute application of those hack-
neyed positions to every aspect of human life, (d) aprioristic hostility 
to other faiths, (e) annihilation of basic civic freedoms, (f) imposition of 
extreme patriarchal domination, (g) intolerance toward secular learn-
ing, the play of reason in shaping human affairs, and scientific explora-
tions and consequent ordering of relationships between humans and 
the natural world, and (h) suppression of the autonomy of the aes-
thetic and, subsequently, the reduction of everyday life to an existence 
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bereft of such creativity and joyous sensibilities as art, music and song, 
poetry, theatre, dance, and sport. Albert Memmi, a long-term sympa-
thizer with the peoples of Africa and the Islamic world, has come to 
the same scathing conclusion:
But the victory of the fundamentalists would be a step backward; none 
of the problems that threaten the modern world would be resolved. On 
the contrary, it would be a systematic return to the past, involving the 
exclusive use of traditional texts, suspicion of all novelty and critical 
thought, the restriction, if not suppression, of the majority of civil liber-
ties, greater police surveillance than that experienced under lay rulers, 
increased attacks on women, the rigorous separation of the sexes, the 
stifling of most anodyne and most natural aspirations of the young—
music, dancing—whose youth will be stolen, confiscated by the monster 
of the theocratic state.21
In short, a reactionary Islamist project, appealing though it might be 
to some who are enveloped by a chaotic and dehumanizing context, 
is replete with cruel and disabling dead-ends. An example of such an 
order was the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
2. Conservative
An immediate attribute of this option is that it is at once more flex-
ible than the reactionary mode and yet saddled with some similar 
problems. First, a conservative Islamist approach has a modicum of 
appreciation for the modern world, at least in the areas of administra-
tive management, economic growth, technological adaptation, social 
welfare, and, though highly filtered, a calculating engagement with 
the rest of the world. Among the deficits are resistance to innovative 
interpretations of the great texts, major constraints on basic personal 
freedoms, and a limited participatory political order tightly woven 
into patriarchal preferences. This perspective’s potential liabilities in 
the long haul might be weighty enough to denude the assets. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and some of the Gulf States, in 
their at times drastically different styles, manifest a basic mixture of 
these attributes.
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3. Democratic and Developmental
This scenario integrates the best of these three sources of tacit knowl-
edge and worthy values: Somali kinship, Islamic piety, and democracy 
and development. The Somali tradition of kinship (as distinct from 
clanism and beset with male dominance) emphasizes general fairness, 
generosity, and obedience to Heer. At the heart of a worldly Islamic 
philosophy is the promotion of peace, justice, and equality for all. “The 
basic élan of the Quran,” writes Fazhur Rahman, is its “stress on socio-
economic justice and essential egalitarianism.” On the other hand, 
democracy’s chief characteristics include individual liberty, choice, and 
constitutional accountability of power, while development underscores 
a perpetual but measured transformation of the cultural, environmen-
tal, scientific, economic, and political spheres of the society. Essential 
indices for gauging such a strategy are an accent on ethical competence 
and legitimate achievement; tolerance, if not respect for, nuance and 
diversity through a normalization of Ijtihad; and freedom of think-
ing in a noncoercive atmosphere. No Muslim country in the modern 
world has fully achieved this scenario. A few are slowly moving in that 
direction, however, with Turkey and Malaysia as the most frequently 
mentioned.
In an earlier work of nearly a decade-and-a-half ago, I suggested 
that a dual challenge was facing Somali society: the first was how to 
make a successful transition from an older and now atrophied mode 
of being in the world to one that could enable Somalis to respond to 
the critical vagaries of their existence—that is, subjective experiences 
and objective imperatives thrown up by the demands of the modern 
world; and, second, that such a transition required a creative and effec-
tive synthesis of kinship, Islamic virtues, and the fruits of modernity.22 
Together, transition and synthesis are tantamount to a gearing up for 
a new ontology. That assignment and what is at stake are even more 
apparent today. If Somalis make headway in their epochal project, 
then, they will have added a precious contribution to the struggle for 
an Islamic cosmopolitanism robust enough to simultaneously co-exist 
comfortably with the multicivilizational modern world and to negoti-
ate successfully the ambiguities of globalization. To be sure, this is the 
most daunting option—one whose pursuit will require all the intel-
ligence, creativity, dexterity, discipline, and patience that Somalis can 
muster. Despite the enormous difficulties, it is a journey pleasing to 
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Allah, possible and most thrilling to begin against the humiliating 
political squalor of the present.
V. The Necessity of the State and Options of Governance
Somalis are no different from other societies in that none could meet 
its basic collective needs (ranging from security to environmental and 
economic well-being to education and scientific advancement) without 
an effective public power. As Adam Smith, the great sage of markets 
and international exchange, taught us long ago, “the authority and 
security of civil government is a necessary condition for the flourish-
ing of liberty, reason, and happiness of humankind.” While this is 
uniform across the modern world, the imperative is greatest among 
late-developing societies. The state is not and cannot be everything 
but its absence is a form of acute social homelessness. Even the World 
Bank, contemporary apostle of market economics, made this landmark 
assertion in 1997, with regard to the indispensability of the state for a 
viable society:
…good government is not a luxury, it is a vital necessity for develop-
ment…an effective state is vital for the provision of goods and services—
and the rules and institutions—that allow markets to flourish and people 
to lead healthier, happier lives.23
The condition of the past sixteen years testifies to the supreme deficits 
that come with the destruction of national political structures. Another 
decade or more of the present situation is too horrible to contemplate. 
But, in order to construct a new national and effective state, Somalis 
will have to address this most difficult of issues: the resurrection of a 
vibrant peoplehood. In that regard, it is a fact that the nationalist spirit 
of collective belonging has been gravely damaged. The consequences 
include mutual suspicion, anger, pent-up revenge, outright hate, and 
social pulverization. At the same time, Somalia cannot amount to much 
even in East Africa, let alone in the world, without a revival of that 
very national identity. Put another way, if Somalis are unable, at least 
at the present, to recreate an intimate political community, they still 
have no choice but to establish a workable civil association that will 
undergird a capable state. This is where a lesson from a metaphorical 
pack of porcupines caught up in trauma similar to the Somali dilemma 
is instructive.
Ahmed I. Samatar
81
There was once, the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer tells us, a colony 
of porcupines. They were wont to huddle together on a cold winter’s 
day and, thus wrapped in communal warmth, to escape being frozen. 
But, plagued with the pricks of each other’s quills, they drew apart. 
And every time the desire for warmth brought them together again, the 
same calamity overtook them. Thus they remained, distracted between 
two misfortunes, able neither to tolerate nor to do without one another, 
until they discovered that when they stood at a certain distance from 
one another they could both delight in one another’s individuality and 
enjoy one another’s company. They did not attribute any metaphysical 
significance to this distance, nor did they imagine it to be an indepen-
dent source of happiness, like finding a friend. They recognized it to be 
a relationship in terms not of substantive enjoyments but of contingent 
considerabilities that they must determine for themselves. Unknown to 
themselves, they had invented civil association.24
1. Annulment of the Union
This option denotes acceptance of the breakup of the Somali Republic 
into two (and more) separate and sovereign states and a return to, 
at minimum, the boundaries established by the colonial powers. The 
rationale for this would include distinct colonial heritages, kin affili-
ations and sub-cultural differences, and a perception that the thirty 
years of union were the basis for nefarious rule best symbolized by 
Siyaad Barre’s regime.
A tearing up of the union, based on these arguments, is hard to 
sustain. First, distinctions between colonial legacies (Britain and Italy) 
had some relevance only during the early years of independence. For 
instance, although both the English and Italian languages gave the edu-
cated elite of each territory a sub-identity, thirty years of union have 
had an impact of such significance that many southern Somalis have 
learned how to function in English (Italian is less frequent). Moreover, 
both languages and their cultural accoutrements were limited to a very 
small segment; the bulk of the population spoke (still speaks) Somali 
(Mai/Maha). Second, though spatial proximity could foster affection 
and intimate exchanges—including intermarriage—it can also create 
anxieties and mutual antipathies (especially in an environment of very 
scant and dwindling resources). In addition, many Somalis have, at 
one time or another, crossed local boundaries and found the experience 
pleasant and enriching. Third, neglect by earlier regimes was nation-
wide; the exceptions were places such as Mogadishu and commercial-
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ized spots in the riverine farming areas. The brutality of the Siyaad 
Barre regime touched many, although the destruction of Hargeisa and 
Burao were unmatched until Mogadishu exploded. Fourth, smallness, 
coupled with underdevelopment, is not beautiful, but hideous. It com-
bines internal brittleness and vulnerability with external manipula-
tions. But the accomplishments must be acknowledged and preserved. 
In the new dialogue to resurrect a national state, then, the leadership 
of the North ought to use these chips as part of a strong inspirational 
and bargaining stance rather than as obstacles to thwart a productive 
national conversation.
2. Confederation
A confederated arrangement means an extremely loose relationship 
between two or more equal states. These states relate to each other 
through some international treaties and cooperate in specifically identi-
fied areas such as trade and defense. In the end, the power of authority 
or sovereignty belongs to each state in the confederation. This mini-
malist arrangement strengthens regional identities and interests at the 
cost of vibrant national institutions. Moreover, there is the real danger 
of some people wanting power for themselves regardless of the conse-
quences for the rest. In the modern world, a confederal arrangement 
is mainly instructive as a historical artifact, the famous Swiss excep-
tion notwithstanding. Some will retort that the current EU resembles 
such a design. Here, however, one must note two points: the great 
diversity that the EU is aggregating (something akin to more than half 
the numbers of contemporary African states) is grounded on many of 
its members already being strong states and, moreover, the insistence 
on the ultimate creation of an effective pan-European form of political 
authority—perhaps a super state.
3. Federation
This form of governance underscores sharing power between regions/
provinces and a central authority. Though the nuances vary, in a federal 
system the central government solely designs and manages areas such 
as defense, international, and fiscal policy. Moreover, it shares with the 
regions responsibilities like revenue generation, education, transporta-
tion and communication, health care, law and order, judiciary, public 
administration, etc. Because of the nature of the distribution of power 
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between the central structures and the somewhat autonomous prov-
inces, federalism also carries some potential major dangers. First, and 
particularly in the current climate, there is the difficulty of establishing 
legitimate provinces. Where does one draw the boundaries? Second, 
what becomes of equity/equality in those potential regions that will 
house within their boundaries different kin groups? What would be 
the lines of accountability between the province and the federal state? 
Who will pay the cost of these levels of political privileges and bureau-
cratic administration? Since this scenario is the one most discussed, if 
not strongly proposed by many, an extremely careful and workable 
response to these concerns is necessary.
4. Decentralized Unitary State
A unitary state need not be a highly centralized form of governance in 
which the regime of the day and the capital of the country monopolize 
power and privilege. This, to a great extent, is the most unforgettable 
lesson from Somalia’s post-colonial era, particularly the Siyaad Barre 
era. A decentralized unitary scenario implies a strong central authority 
but leaves some limited but important local decisions to the provinces 
of the country. In comparison with a federal system, the center will be 
mightier, with a clear secondary role for provincial and local authority. 
The latter’s power is voluntarily ceded by the center; the central state, 
however, monitors how that power is applied. There is little doubt that 
a decentralized unitary state could be an effective mechanism to speak 
on behalf of the whole Somali nation, and immediately undertake the 
urgently needed projects of reconciliation, law and order, and reha-
bilitation of the national infrastructure. But there are unavoidable and 
large questions here too: How far will the authority of a decentralized 
unitary state go? Will the provinces have the constitutional mandate to 
reign in a dictatorial central leadership? What liberties must be sought 
through the structure of governance? What liberties must be promoted 
within? What liberties must be protected from the reach of political 
authority? In other words, what concrete constitutional arrangements 
are needed to shield the society from a repeat of the worst of the 
post-colonial experience? Are the porcupines ready and willing not 
to embrace too tightly, yet get close enough to each other to form this 
type of a state?
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VI. A Concluding Remark: Beyond the TFG
The Somali people, like other humans, cannot avoid the maelstrom of 
their own history. Consequently, the choice is stark: bear the testing 
burdens of transition and invent a stronger somalinimoo and a correlate 
civic agenda or to continue, to paraphrase Bunyon, pulling flesh from 
each other’s bones—the price of living in chronic political ignominy. In 
addition to the discredited way in which the TFG was born, the tran-
sitional leadership is directly responsible for at least two phenomena: 
a Somali invitation for an Ethiopian military invasion and consequent 
occupation of Mogadishu; and a demonization of any Somali political 
consciousness intersecting with Islamic thought and deduced practi-
cal design. Hitherto, most Somalis believed such acts to be so obscene 
that they ruled them out of the realm of the possible. The two items 
are intertwined but the latter is often prejudged through the prism of 
“terrorism.” For Ethiopian ruling elites, it is an easy stance to embrace. 
It fits well into a longstanding maltreatment of Muslim Ethiopians. 
Despite the fact that at least half of the population is Muslim, the 
power of the state, the commanding nodal points of the economy, and 
the national cultural symbols have been dominated by the interests 
and identity of the Coptic Christians. More specifically, the Somali-
inhabited region is still the most impoverished of them all. In this 
regard, although some changes in the way citizens of Somali heritage 
are dealt with have been less harsh compared to earlier regimes, their 
marginalization is still acute. Compounded by an apprehension based 
on the Somali national belief that the region was wrongfully ceded to 
Ethiopia by the colonial powers, the Ethiopian political class has consis-
tently maintained a deep suspicion of, if not outright hostility towards, 
a purposeful Somali people and their state. In other words, Ethiopian 
leaders have always maneuvered to weaken any Somali national proj-
ect. Notwithstanding the fact that the old Somali state gave direct and 
concrete succor to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi during his years as 
a hard-up dissident, the old grammar of Ethiopian obsession with 
Somali national identity has not changed. Consequently, it did not take 
much for the current leadership to jump into the front seat of the band-
wagon of equating the resurgence of Islamist thinking in the Horn of 
Africa to being the dangerous “other” and thus deserving of military 
preemption. Among the great tragedies of the moment, however, is 
the hoodwinking of the United States, much admired by most Somalis, 
to endorse and actively support both the Ethiopian invasion and the 
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much detested warlords masquerading as legitimate national leaders 
of a new Somali democratic political dispensation. The aerial bombard-
ment of fishing villages in the most southern coastal tip of the country, 
alleged to be hiding places for individuals suspected of participating 
in the terrorist destruction of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-
es-Salaam, cost at least seventy lives. This is now part of a bitter and 
spreading lore among the Somali people who are at a loss as to why 
the United States is prone to act so blunderingly. The bewilderment is 
accented because most Somalis believe that the UIC invited the United 
States government to come in and conduct a maximum search for the 
suspected individuals said to have a sanctuary in the country.
If it is true in this contemporary diremption that the Somali Repub-
lic has lost almost everything, it has only one choice: to reimagine 
itself. To do that, the most immediate and supreme tasks for the Somali 
people, inside and outside, are to:
•  establish a well-organized and vocal movement that salvages the 
country from Ethiopian occupation and manipulation;
•  create a credible alternative (a prefiguration of a future that is not—
yet) to the TFG in terms of ideas, organization, and leadership;
•  link tightly the domestic communities and a mobilized diaspora;
•  effectively explain to the world, particularly the United States, the 
European Union, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic 
States, the United Nations, and major NGOs, the realities of the situ-
ation in the Somali Republic and the yearning of the majority of the 
Somali people for a democratic developmental order and legitimate 
and competent leadership, enriched by their own virtuous tradi-
tions.
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the following (a tad hyperbolic) statement:
We are not using the world ‘genocide’ loosely here. The mass murder, rampant 
slaughter of innocent Somalis, the displacement of more than 100,000 people and 
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2007 by the Ethiopian armed forces that have resulted in the killing of approxi-
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for African Affairs, which incited Ethiopian troops to continue down its path of 
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people and prosecute the criminals responsible for these hideous crimes.”
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‘Guantanamo Bay’ in Cuba, where innocent people are being tortured.”
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‘Trojan Horse’ for the unjust Ethiopian occupation.”
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rial Meeting of IGAD member states that was held on Friday, April 13, 2007 against 
the independence and sovereignty of Somalia, where they praised and incited the 
brutal assault carried out by the Ethiopian troops in Somalia. We commend the 
honest and genuine approach of the governments of Eritrea, Sudan, and Djibouti 
towards their view in the Somali issue.”
•  “We request the concerned local and international humanitarian organizations to 
deliver urgent relief supplies to displaced Somalis everywhere, in particular food 
and medical treatments because concentration of human population formed sud-
denly may result in sweeping epidemics such as cholera and typhoid.”
21. Albert Memmi, Decolonization and the Decolonized (trans. Robert Bononno), Minneapo-
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